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Abstract  
In this paper I argue that there has been a critical shift towards war by conservation in which 
conservation, security and counter insurgency (COIN) are becoming more closely integrated. In this 
new phase concerns about global security constitute important underlying drivers, while biodiversity 
conservation is of secondary importance. This is a significant break from earlier phases of fortress 
conservation and war for biodiversity. In order to develop a better understanding of these shifts, this 
paper analyzes the existing conceptual approaches, notably environmental security analyses which 
seek to understand how resources cause or shape conflict, and political ecology approaches that 
focus on the struggles over access to and control over resources. However, this paper indicates the 
limitations of these existing debates for understanding recent shifts, which require a fresh approach.  
I chart the rise of the narrative I call poachers-as-terrorists, which relies on the invocation of the idea 
that ivory is the white gold of Jihad, a phrase which is closely associated with an Elephant Action 
League (EAL) report in 2012 which claimed Al Shabaab used ivory to fund its operations. This 
narrative is being extended and deepened by a powerful alliance of states, conservation NGOs, 
Private Military Companies and international organizations, such that it is shaping policies, 
especially in areas of US geo-strategic interest in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a result conservation is 
becoming a core element of a global security project, with significant implications for conceptual 
debates and for conservation practice on the ground. 
 
Key words: conservation, war for biodiversity, war on terror, environmental security, political 
ecology, Kenya 
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War, by Conservation 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper explores a new phase of conservation which combines biodiversity losses with concerns 
about with global security, such that there has been a shift to what I characterize as war by 
conservation, in both discursive and material terms. Political ecologists have already produced an 
interesting and substantial analysis of the relationships between conservation, violence and conflict 
(see for example Peluso, 1992; Peluso and Watts (eds) 2001; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2011; 
Lunstrum, 2014; Neumann, 2004; Fairhead, 2001; Ybarra, 2012; Pearson, 2012). However, current 
shifts in conservation mean these important debates need a thorough a re-examination. This is not 
MXVWD µEDFN WR WKHEDUULHUV¶RU IRUWUHVVFRQVHUvation movement, which implies a retreat behind the 
fences of heavily defended protected areas. This is an µRIIHQVLYH SRVLWLRQ¶ in certain locations 
whereby conservation is the intervening aggressor, not simply the defender of wildlife; war by 
conservation is a proactive, interventionist militarized response that is spatially amorphous and 
extends well beyond protected areas and into the land and communities surrounding them. While 
political ecologists have highlighted the ways that conservation strategies can be violent, this new 
phase of war by conservation differs because it combines anxieties about global security, with 
environmental concerns and counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques. One of its main driving 
objectives is security and stabilization of areas that are of geostrategic interest to the US-led War on 
Terror. Furthermore,  this new phase can be characterised as war by conservation because 
conservation agencies themselves are becoming are engaged in use of force against people they 
identify as poachers and as members of terrorist networks.  
There is an increasing tendency to discursively frame poaching via reference to terrorism; 
this has been extended and embedded via invocation of the idea that ivory is the white gold of jihad, 
a phrase which is closely associated with a 2012 report from Elephant Action League (EAL) (Kalron 
and Crosta, 2012; White, 2014). The narrative of what I call poachers-as-terrorists renders the 
complexity of poaching invisible; further it has the effect of displacing alternative, longer standing 
approaches to poaching which seek to understand the very different reasons why different people 
engage in illegal hunting in a range of locations. It also distracts attention from the well documented 
ways that states, political patronage networks, standing armies and private companies engage in or 
collude with poaching (see Duffy, 2014; Ellis, 1994; Reeve and Ellis, 1995). The narrative of 
poachers-as-terrorists resonates with wider conceptual approaches of environmental security which 
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aim to understand how groups engaged in violent conflict utilize natural resources to fund and 
support their operations (for example see Le Billon, 2008; Berdal and Malone (eds) 2000).  
However, in this paper I argue that framings of poachers-as-terrorists and casting ivory as 
white gold of jihad are simplistic and poorly evidenced; yet, they have gained traction because they 
intersect with pre-existing concerns about global security, specifically anxieties about the expansion 
RI µWHUURULVW QHWZRUNV¶ SRVW  Further, this discursive production of poachers-as-terrorists has 
material effects, especially in areas that are of geo-strategic interest for the US-led War on Terror. 
The material outcome is that it has become more possible to consider greater use of force, including 
COIN, for any perceived or actual threat to certain iconic species (notably elephants). As such, war 
by conservation also represents a conceptual shift in current thinking in political ecology and 
environmental security about the links between natural resources and conflict. While this paper 
focuses specifically on the debates around the potential link between ivory poaching and Al Shabaab 
in East Africa, the rapidly shifting dynamics in the conservation sector have parallels elsewhere (see 
Ybarra in this issue, Lombard in this issue). 
These shifts deserve greater critical analysis. First, I examine the relevant debates from 
environmental security and political ecology; second, I sketch out the recent redefinition of poachers 
as terrorists; and finally I offer an analysis of how this is shifting practice towards war by 
conservation. The purpose is to explore the theoretical and evidential bases of the ways narratives 
around poaching are being reconfigured to combine with, deepen and extend global security 
concerns. This paper also demonstrates how those narratives have material effects and are producing 
a new phase of war by conservation. 
 
2. Shifting from War for Biodiversity to War By Conservation 
I argue that we are witnessing a shift to a new phase of war by conservation, but first it is important 
to note that this builds on earlier approaches to conservation, notably fortress conservation and war 
for biodiversity. War by conservation represents a continuity of some aspects of previous 
conservation practice, since there has been a long and well documented history of the use of force 
against people to protect wildlife and militarization of protected areas, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa (see Neumann, 2004; West, Igoe and Brockington, 2006; Rotshuizen and Smith, 2013; Ellis, 
1994; Reeve and Ellis, 1995). In order to understand how this current phase differs, it is useful to 
provide a brief explanation of these earlier approaches.  
There is already a substantial analysis of the significance of the fortress approach to 
conservation (Brockington, 2002; Brockington, Duffy and Igoe, 2008: 17-86; West, Igoe and 
Brockington, 2006; Peluso, 1992) and the ideas and practices of war for biodiversity (Neumann, 
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2004; Duffy, 2014; Peluso, 1992). Fortress conservation denotes a model of protected areas, 
produced via removal, eviction or displacement of local communities to provide separate territories 
for wildlife; it is closely associated with the historical extension of the model of national parks 
provided by Yellowstone National Park in the USA (see Brockington, 2002; Brockington, Duffy and 
Igoe, 2008: 17-86; Adams, 2004). War for biodiversity denotes the sense that wildlife is under threat 
and therefore conservation agencies need to  engage in more forceful approaches to protect wildlife, 
to such that it was commonly referred to as a war to save them (Duffy, 2014).  This was 
accompanied by greater degrees of militarization of protected areas, especially across Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Rotshuizen and Smith, 2013; Reeve and Ellis, 1995).  War by conservation represents a 
break with this earlier phase because it is characterized by a much fuller integration of conservation 
objectives with global security concerns, specifically the US-led War on Terror and COIN, such that 
conservation is relegated to a position of secondary importance.  Furthermore, conservation agencies 
are increasingly engaged in using force to tackle those identified as poachers and as members of 
terrorist networks. As such conservation and security concerns are combining in new ways.  
This shift has been facilitated by a series of factors. One of these is the rises in poaching 
wildlife, especially of elephants and rhinos in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Duffy, St. John, Büscher and 
Brockington, 2015a, 2015b). Data from the Monitoring Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE)1 
database indicates that rates of illegal killing of elephants across Africa rose from 0.6 - 2.1 % of the 
total population in 2005, to 3.5 -11.7% in 2011 (CITES, 2012: 5; also see Wittemyer et al. 2014). An 
estimated 15,000 elephants were killed in 42 MIKE monitored sites in 2012 (Nellemann et al (eds), 
2014: 32). Rates of rhino poaching have also increased substantially since 2008, with the majority of 
rhinos poached in Zimbabwe and South Africa; in 2007 approximately 50 rhinos were poached in 
South Africa alone, yet in 2013 over 1000 were illegally killed (Nellemann et al (eds), 2014: 37; also 
see Standley and Emslie, 2013: 6; Milliken, Emslie and Talukdar, 2009: 4; Ayling, 2013).  
The drivers behind such rises in poaching and trafficking are complex and wide ranging, but 
a key factor has been the rise in wealth in existing consumer states (such as China in the case of 
ivory) and a mix of rising wealth and shifting cultural norms in new markets (as in the case of rhino 
horn consumption in Vietnam) (see TRAFFIC, 2008; Shaw and Milliken, 2012; Challender and 
MacMillan, 2014; Duffy, St. John, Büscher and Brockington, 2015b).  The figures do indicate a 
genuine rise in poaching of rhinos and elephants, rather than simply an increase in detection rates. 
The rises have led to calls from Governments and conservation NGOs for a more aggressive 
approach to anti-poaching by state conservation agencies, private sector wildlife managers and 
                                                 
1
 MIKE Database http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/mike/index.php. (accessed 13.09.14) 
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conservation NGOs alike; this is especially the case in areas of Sub-Saharan Africa where concerns 
about security (notably concerns about Al-Shabaab activity) coincide with rises in organized forms 
of poaching. The development of this dynamic has allowed conservation and security to combine in 
ways that require a fresh examination of existing conceptual approaches. The link between 
conservation and conflict is an increasingly important area for global policy. For example, Achim 
Steiner, UN Under-Secretary General and Executive Director of UNEP recently stated in a joint 
UNEP and INTERPOL report that µHven the security and safety of countries and communities is 
DIIHFWHG«wildlife and forest crime, including charcoal, provides potentially significant threat 
finance to militias and terrorist groups. Already recognized as a grave issue in DRC and Somalia by 
the UN Security Council, the assessment reveals that the scale and role of wildlife and forest crime in 
threat finance calls for much wider policy attention¶ opening statement in Nellemann et al (eds), 
2014: 4) 
Environmental security analysts investigate the link between natural resources and violent 
conflict. The approach is closely identified with the works of the Toronto Group and Thomas 
Homer-Dixon (Homer-Dixon, 1999; 1994; 1991). Homer-Dixon (1994) argues decreasing supplies 
of controllable resources, such as clean water and good agricultural land will provoke interstate 
µVLPSOH VFDUFLW\¶ FRQIOLFWV RU UHVRXUFH ZDUV; that large population movements caused by 
environmental stress will induce group identity conflicts and especially ethnic clashes; and that 
severe environmental scarcity will increase economic deprivation and disrupt key social institutions 
which would cause deprivation conflicts such as civil strife and insurgency (also see Homer-Dixon, 
1999; 1991).  
However, the methods and approach used by the Toronto Group have been criticized by 
Gleditsch and others for their reliance on large N-study databases, lack of engagement with specific 
case studies and over reliance on country-year and inter-state conflict data (Gleditsch, 2012; 
Gleditsch, 1998; Buhaug, 2010; Butler and Gates, 2012; Peluso and Watts (eds), 2001). It is 
important to note that environmental security encompasses a much wider range of arguments than 
those posed by Homer-Dixon and include notions of a conflict trap (Collier et al, 2003; Bannon and 
Collier (eds) 2003); Collier, Conway and Venables, 2008; also see Matthew, Halle and Switzer, 
2002; Kaplan, 1994). They draw on a longer tradition of Malthusian understandings of environment-
society interactions, which views violence as an outcome of natural resource scarcity, thereby acting 
DVDµQDWXUDOFKHFN¶RQSRSXODWLRQJURZWKIdeas of the environment as a source of conflict, or as a 
security threat also resonated with the redefinition of conflict in the post-&ROG :DU HUD DV µ1HZ
:DUV¶ (Kaldor, 2012; Berdal, 2003); the emergence of non-traditional security threats such as global 
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environmental change (Selby, 2014); as well as arguments that greed and grievance were motivators 
for conflict (Berdal and Malone (eds), 2000; Nellemann et al (eds), 2014: 48-49).  
Environmental security has been criticized for the ways it links environmental change and 
violent conflict, not least by political ecologists (Selby, 2014; Selby and Hoffman, 2014; Hartman, 
2014; Fairhead, Leach and Scoones, 2012; Benjaminsen et al, 2012). The environmental security 
debate does not adequately explain war by conservation either. It can be useful for thinking through 
how resources and conflict might be linked for example, how wildlife products might be used to fund 
militias. However, in this paper I question exactly these sorts of claims and offer an explanation for 
why and how such arguments can rise to international prominence under certain circumstances.  First 
though, it is useful to investigate the points raised by political ecologists who have provided 
important examinations of the linkages between violence and conservation. As stated earlier, 
Neumann notes that war is a common model for biodiversity protection in Africa, where protected 
areas become spaces of violence in which human rights abuses and use of deadly violence against 
humans in defence of wildlife have become normalised (Neumann, 2004: 813; Peluso and 
Vandergeest, 2011; White, 2014; Bocarejo and Ojeda, in this issue). For Neumann this is explained 
via a deep seated fear of the poor and their claims on resources, tapping in to the Malthusian 
interpretations of environmental security which encourage conservation agencies to view poor 
people as combatants (Neumann, 2004: 816-822).  
Le Billion (2012) questions the idea of resource wars and seeks to understand the links 
between resources and conflict. He focuses on oil, gems and timber and argues resources make wars 
more likely, and that they have an influence on the severity and duration of conflict. Le BillLRQ¶V
contention is that economic dependence on some resources can increase vulnerability to armed 
conflict, that the social relations of production around resources matter, and that opportunity to 
H[WUDFW RU  WKH µORRWDELOLW\¶ RI WKH UHVRXUFH LV DOVR LPSRrtant (also see Le Billon, 2005, 2001).  
Furthermore it is important to note the ways that resources can be used by states to extend and 
maintain control. In their review of the political ecologies of war and forests, Peluso and 
Vandergeest strongly argue that from the 1950s to the 1970s natures were remade in relation to 
nation-states, particularly via counter insurgency operations; the purpose of the drawing in forests as 
sites of counter-insurgency activity and nation-building was to extend and deepen state power at a 
time when the reach of centrally focused states was limited (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2011: 587; also 
see Dunn, 2009). Such initiatives can also neatly intersect with state objectives to quell, control or 
GLVSODFH µXQUXO\¶ SRSXODWLRQV RU JURups operating across international borders via counter 
insurgency operations, in which biodiversity conservation can play a central and legitimating role, 
thus deepening and extending state power (Ybarra, 2012: 497-498; also see Peluso, 1992; Neumann, 
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1998; Le Billon, 2001, 2008; Bocarejo and Ojeda, in this issue). Appeals to protect and save natural 
or national heritage are frequently overlain with the argument that states have a moral obligation to 
protect key wildlife populations, and such appeals can be traced to the colonial period (especially in 
the British Empire, see MacKenzie, 1988). This current phase differs - it relies on the idea that 
securing natural heritage will simultaneously achieve national security objectives, and more 
critically, address global security concerns, notably the US-led War on Terror. In arguments about 
war by conservation, that nature (wildlife) is remade to extend and deepen the powers of states 
engaged in the War on Terror in areas where they currently have limited reach. The debates from 
within political ecology are useful for understanding how states use environmental initiatives to gain 
greater levels of control over specific territories and populations. However, it does not explain the 
mechanisms by which this is made possible, and in this paper I cast light on how this shift can occur. 
 I aim to develop a better understanding of how new approaches differ from fortress 
conservation because war by conservation integrates concerns about biodiversity losses with a global 
security agenda and wider justifications of the use of COIN techniques. The ways that a range of 
organizations present the links between poaching, conflict and terrorism reflect and extend the 
arguments from environmental security and political ecology, that lucrative and lootable natural 
resources might fuel conflicts. However, I suggest that this argument is not borne out by the evidence 
which is presented to support the position that ivory poaching funds terrorism. What is interesting is 
that the argument is readily accepted precisely because it matches and extends pre-existing concerns 
about global security; further, the claims are deployed to provide a rationale for a more 
interventionist approach and as a justification for the extension of a range of surveillance and COIN 
techniques more commonly associated with the War on Terror. 
 
3. The Discursive Production of Poachers-As-Terrorists 
In this section I chart the rise of a narrative that I have termed poachers-as-terrorists.  Here it is 
useful to examine in detail how poachers are being redefined not just as a national or regional 
security threats but as a critical global security threat, providing a legitimating base for arguments in 
support of war by conservation.  This is not to suggest that all forms of poaching in a diverse range 
of locations is being discursively linked to terrorism, it is not; here I argue that the linkage of 
poaching with terrorism and organized crime is becoming one of the primary lenses through which 
concerns about poaching and biodiversity losses are being articulated by an alliance of powerful 
actors that encompasses states, militaries, conservation NGOs and private military companies.  The 
claims have been amplified and extended by various news media. However, these debates do not 
reflect the complex range of different kinds of poachers, including key differences between 
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commercial and subsistence poachers (for more discussion see Duffy, 2014; Duffy, St. John,  
Büscher and Brockingon, 2015a). Nor do they reflect the historical production of poaching as a 
crime by the criminalisation of African hunting methods by successive colonial administrations 
(MacKenzie, 1988; Neumann, 2004). Finally, the invocation of global security threats via reference 
to poachers-as-terrorists also distracts from and obscures the well documented involvement of states 
and armies in large scale poaching for ivory and rhino horn; one of the best documented cases is the 
involvement of the South African Defence Force in poaching in Southern Africa in the 1980s, which 
traded in ivory, rhino horn, hardwoods and drugs to fund its campaigns in South West Africa (now 
Namibia), Angola and Mozambique (Reeve and Ellis, 1995; Ellis, 1994; Kumleben, 1996).   
There has been a growing concern about the relationships between poaching, wildlife 
trafficking and regional or global security. Such concerns resonate with debates from environmental 
security (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Gleditsch, 2012; Gleditsch, 1998; Buhaug, 2010; Butler and Gates, 
2012; Collier et al, 2003; Bannon and Collier (eds) 2003). For example, the International Consortium 
for Combatting Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) was established in 2010 in recognition of the need to 
tackle the growing influence on transnational organized crime in trafficking of endangered species. It 
was an initiative of  Interpol, CITES, the World Bank, The World Customs Union and the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime, and the purpose was to provide co-ordinated support to national wildlife law 
enforcement agencies, as well as regional networks; so for example ICCWC provided specialised 
training for national agencies in 2013.2 Major donors are also taking this issue seriously and funding 
has been made available for anti-poaching and anti-trafficking initiatives in areas of geo-strategic 
interest (see Lawson and Vines, 2014). Furthermore, linking poaching to global terrorism has shaped 
arguments about appropriate responses. The coding of poachers-as-terrorists creates the context in 
which conservation NGOs, states and the private sector can call for more forceful approaches.  
Indeed this theme was evident at the FRQIHUHQFH µInternational Wildlife Trafficking: Solutions to a 
Global &ULVLV¶KHOG by United for Wildlife at Zoological Society of London (ZSL) in February 2013 
in advance of the high level London Conference on combatting trafficking (also February 2013); 
Will Travers of Born Free Foundation publicly stated that conservation NGOs needed to talk the 
language of global poverty and global security to remain relevant.3 This is indicative of the ways that 
NGOs increasingly operate in a context in which they must compete for public attention and sources 
of funding (for further discussion see Cooley and Ron, 2002). 
                                                 
2
  See http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/iccwc.php; http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/International-
Consortium-on-Combating-Wildlife-Crime; also see Sellar, 2014. 
3
 United for Wildlife Symposium on international wildlife trafficking, 11-12 February 2014, a full recording is available 
at http://www.zsl.org/science/previous-scientific-events/symposium-international-wildlife-trafficking (accessed 
15.08.14); the author was also present at the conference.  
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Below I set out the range of organizations that invoke global security as a rationale for 
conservation, by drawing a link between poaching and terrorism.  I analyze public statements from 
key actors from four groups involved in high profile debates about the links between poaching and 
global security: conservation NGOs, expert witness testimonial to the US Congress, national 
governments and international organizations.  Many more organizations are also promoting this 
particular argument, but for reasons of space it is impossible to review them all, so here I focus on 
the most influential ones in order to trace how the discursive production of poachers-as-terrorists has 
developed. 
In this paper I demonstrate how a poorly evidenced claim provided by an Elephant Action 
League (EAL) Report in 2012 has risen to global prominence. It is rare that we are able to trace the 
inception, evolution and extension of a narrative, but it is possible in this case. A key issue is not 
whether we can establish beyond any doubt that ivory is used to fund Al Shabaab or that poaching 
contributes to global instability; what is important is that a very wide range of organizations are all 
telling a remarkably similar story in very similar ways. Here I want to chart the rise of the µpoacher-
as-terrorist¶IUDPLQJ and the EAL reference to ivory as the white gold of jihad (I have sketched out a 
broad timeline in Appendix 1). The claim has been taken up and extended for two reasons: first 
because it taps into a pre-existing and deep-seated fear about the expansion of terrorism networks 
post 9/11; and second because it might offer the possibility of a new and lucrative stream of funding 
for conservation NGOs.  
First, it is useful to analyze the evidence base for claims that ivory poaching is linked to 
terrorism. The EAL report was based on undercover research in Somalia where EAL researchers 
were able to interview informants claimed that there were some traders on the coast who 
occasionally traded ivory and the ivory sometimes came from Al Shabaab operatives. The video and 
audio evidence remain confidential due to fears about reprisals against informants. However, the 
evidence was shown in confidence to a number of security agencies around the world.4 The report on 
the investigation was placed on the EAL website in 2012 but was only reported by the international 
media after the attacNVRQ1DLUREL¶V:HVWJDWH0DOO-24 September 2013.  Since then, the argument 
that Al Shabaab uses ivory to finance its operations has proliferated. It is possible that the reliance on 
a single EAL report partly accounts for the remarkable similarity of the statements on ivory, 
terrorism and Al Shabaab. The claim has been repeated by several organizations with either no 
reference to any supporting evidence or via reference to very limited supporting documentation; 
however, the claims have been repeated in several published papers by think tanks, academics and 
                                                 
4
 Personal communication from conservation professional via email to author (25.02.14); 
http://elephantleague.org/project/africas-white-gold-of-jihad-al-shabaab-and-conflict-ivory/ 
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international organizations. In turn those published documents are increasingly cited as supporting 
evidence, even though they only repeat the original poorly evidenced statements; these include media 
UHSRUWV LQ QDWLRQDO QHZVSDSHUV VXFK DV WKH 8.¶V Independent,5 DQG D UHFHQW UHSRUW E\ WKH 8.¶V
Chatham House (Lawson and Vines, 2014). They all cite the same EAL investigation and newsmedia 
reports as the core, or only, supporting evidence.  Yet, a recent report from UNEP and INTERPOL 
on environmental crime questions the accuracy of the links between ivory and Al Shabaab. The 
report points out that ivory may be a major source of income for militia groups (especially 
Janjaweed) in DRC and Central African Republic; however, it notes that claims Al Shabaab was 
trafficking 30.6 tonnes of ivory per annum (representing 3600 elephants per year) through southern 
6RPDOLDDUHµKLJKO\XQUHOLDEOH¶ and that the main sources of income for Al Shabaab remain charcoal 
trading and ex-pat finance (Nellemann et al (eds), 2014: 78-81; also see Menkhaus cited in Williams, 
2014: 909; and Mcguire/RUSI, 2015). 
It can be argued that the current concerns around the links between ivory poaching and Al 
Shabaab reflect a more established and historical fear of Somalia as a source of instability and 
criminal activity in the region. During the 1980s the KWS blamed Somali shifta (bandits) for 
crossing the border to wipe out the elephant population (Leakey, 2001: 102). Furthermore, Williams 
(2014) argues that following major offensives in Somalia, Al Shabaab is becoming a less powerful 
and significant force which means that the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have turned their attention towards stabilization rather than 
concentrating on offensives against the group.  
 Nevertheless, claims that there is a link between ivory and terrorism are becoming central to 
the legitimating arguments of policy networks, especially in US and UK Government circles. For 
example, in 2012 the US Senate and US House of Representatives held a special congressional 
KHDULQJRQ WKH µ7KH*OREDO3RDFKLQJ&ULVLV¶  Reviewing the evidence reveals that concerns were 
raised in 2012 that wildlife products might be used to fund terrorism. It concluGHGWKDWµEvidence is 
mounting that Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate, and the Lord's Resistance Army are using these 
illegal animal products to fund their brutal campaigns of YLROHQFH WKURXJKRXW WKH UHJLRQ¶.6 At the 
meeting the founder of the influential US International Conservation Caucus Foundation, David 
Barron, stated that 
 
                                                 
5
 The Independent, 04.02.14, Elephant Campaign: How AfriFD¶VµZKLWHJROG¶IXQGVWKHDO-Shabaab militants 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/campaigns/elephant-campaign/elephant-campaign-how-africas-white-gold-funds-
the-alshabaab-militants-9102862.html (accessed 25.06.14). 
6
 http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=447&Itemid=369 (accessed 29.04.13). 
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µ8QOHVV WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV WDNHV VWURQJ DFWLRQ WR FRPEDW WKH LOOHJDO SRDFKLQJ DQG WUDGH RI
wildlife, terrorist groups will be increasingly fortified with funding and safe havens in Africa 
IURPZKLFKWRODXQFKDWWDFNVDJDLQVWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGRXUJOREDOLQWHUHVWV¶7 
 
The link was reiterated at a meeting of the International Conservation Caucus Foundation (ICCF).8 
At the ICCF meeting expert witnesses carefully stated that ivory may fund Al Shabaab operations or 
that ivory is an ideal commodity for groups like Al Shabaab (as well as LRA and Janjaweed).9   
However ICCF does not offer any supporting evidence, save the statements of expert witnesses and 
links to a 2012 article in National Geographic HQWLWOHGµ%ORRG ,YRU\ ,YRU\:RUVKLS¶10 and a 2012 
New York Times article by Jeffrey Gettleman11 HQWLWOHGµ(OHSKDQWV'\LQJLQDQ(SLF)UHQ]\DV,YRU\
Fuels Wars aQG 3URILWV¶12 In January 2015 two US Senators (Graham and Feinstein) from ICCF 
introduced a bill to introduce a Wildlife Trafficking Act in the US which would impose harsher 
penalties on traffickers; what was significant, for the purposes of this paper, was that the rationale 
SURYLGHGZDVWKDWµIllegal wildlife trafficking ranks among the top five global crimes, generating an 
estimated US$8 billion to US$10 billion in illicit funds annually. There is also increasing evidence 
that illegal wildlife traffickinJ LV IXQGLQJ DUPHG LQVXUJHQFLHV LQFOXGLQJ $O 6KDEDDE WKH /RUG¶V
Resistance Army and the Janjaweed, which threaten the stability and security of many countries in 
Africa. 13 This characterization of Al Shabaab fits within the wider conceptual debates of 
environmental security that aim to establish a link between natural resources as a financial underpin 
for conflicts (Berdal and Malone (eds) 2000; Le Billon, 2008, 2012). However, in this paper I contest 
that characterization and instead argue that the discursive link between poaching and terrorism is 
used to further the interests of the US-led War on Terror and has meant that conservation has been 
integrated into much wider sets of policy debates and initiatives linked to global security. Indeed, as 
Eckert and Biersteker (2010) note in their analysis of the use of statistics in policy debates around 
financing terrorism, under and over counting by NGOs, international institutions and Governments, 
                                                 
7
 http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=447&Itemid=369 (accessed 29.04.13). 
8
 ICCF was established in 2006 to support the work of the International Conservation Caucus, the second largest caucus 
in the US Congress. For more information on the work on ICCF see Corson (2010) and 
http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=63 (accessed 01.09.14). 
9
 Transcript of expert witness evidence provided at a hearing of  ICCF 
http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=447&Itemid=369 (accessed 13.08.14); and 
http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=445&Itemid=367 (accessed 13.08.14). 
10
 &KULVW\%ULDQµ%ORRG,YRU\,YRU\:RUVKLS¶National Geographic 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2012/10/ivory/christy-text (accessed 15.08.14) 
11
 *HWWOHPDQ-HIIUH\µ(OHSKDQWV'\LQJLQDQ(SLF)UHQ]\DV,YRU\)XHOV:DUVDQG3URILWV¶New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/africa/africas-elephants-are-being-slaughtered-in-poaching-
frenzy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
12
 http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=445&Itemid=367 (accessed 13.08.14) 
13
 Senators Graham and Feinstein Introduce Bill to Crack Down on Illegal Wildlife Trafficking,  
http://iccfoundation.us/what-we-do/conservation_updates/jan-9-2015.html (accessed 10.02.15) 
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are a common problem because the debates are driven by particular political imperatives to garner 
support for specific policy agendas (also see Andreas and Greenhill, 2010).  
In order to understand how a poorly evidenced claim has risen to prominence, it is important 
to delve into the statements made by expert witnesses, all of whom are well known individuals in the 
international conservation community. A number of expert witnesses are drawn from the same 
conservation NGOs that are actively promoting the message that increased poaching and the illegal 
wildlife trade constitute a significant threat to global stability and, more specifically US national 
interests. As experts, their opinions can have a significant impact in shaping how we understand 
poaching and its relevance to wider social, political and economic concerns, or in this case to global 
security concerns (White, 2014; also see debates on the importance of epistemic communities, 
notably Haas, 1992 and Davis Cross, 2013). It is via such platforms that particular understandings of 
poaching, and the potential threats it might pose, become widely accepted.  
TKHKHDULQJRQµ7KH*OREDO3RDFKLQJ&ULVLV¶KHDUGH[SHUWZLWQHVVWHVWLPRQLDOVIURP,DQ
J. Saunders of the Tsavo Trust, who claimed that rangers were now engaged in low level counter 
insurgency against rebel groups. He stated WKDWWKHUHZDVDµcredible, increasing security threat from 
$O6KDEDDELQ(DVW$IULFDDQGWKDWWKLVZLOOEHIXHOOHGIURPWKHZLGHULOOHJDOWUDGHLQLYRU\¶14 This 
statement also makes it clear that international action is required to save important species that are 
unable to defend themselves against an aggressor, in this case the poacher-as-terrorist, presented as a 
legitimate target for war by conservation. Further expert witness testimonial was provided by 
Michael Fay, Senior Conservationist for Wildlife Conservation Society (which runs the 96 Elephants 
Campaign) who made similar supporting statements, and made the case that conservation projects in 
FHUWDLQ$IULFDQ6WDWHV µSXWRXW brush fires of illegal activity that degrade security in these nations, 
KXUWLQJ86LQWHUHVWV¶15   
7KHµEUDQGLQJ¶RILYRU\DVWKHwhite gold of jihad has also been promoted by high profile 
commentators writing in widely read and well respected newsmedia. For example, Monica 
Medina, a former special assistant the Secretary for Defense in the US Department of Defense  
wrote an Op Ed piece for the New York Times (30.09.14) HQWLWOHG µ:KLWH *ROG RI -LKDG¶ VHH
White, 2014); in the article she also refers to a  panel in November 2012 sponsored by the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and National Geographic on what the military could do to help, in 
the run up to Hillary &OLQWRQ¶VDQQRXQFHPHQWRIa major State Department initiative to combat 
                                                 
14
 http://iccfoundation.us/downloads/Hearing_Testimony_Saunders.pdf (accessed 29.04.14).p.6. 
15
 http://iccfoundation.us/downloads/Hearing_Testimony_Fay.pdf (accessed 29.04.14).p.4. 
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illegal wildlife trafficking.16 Well known film directors have also combined with conservation 
NGOs to spread the message that ivory funds terrorism; in December 2014, film director Kathryn 
Bigelow released a short animated film, The Last Days of Ivory in conjunction with WildAid, 
which directly links buying ivory in China to funding conflict and terrorism in the Horn of 
Africa;17 WKH ILOP¶V FDPSDLJQ VORJDQ LV µ(QG ,YRU\ )XQGHG 7HUURULVP¶ DQG LV LQWHQGHG WR EH D
fundraising vehicle aimed at English speaking audiences.  
The influence of the hearings, expert witness testimonials and NGO campaigns are clearly 
discernible in recent policy commitments by the US Government. For example, in July 2013, 
President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13648 on Combating Wildlife Trafficking. The 
Executive Order stateG µ:LOGOLIH WUDIILFNLQJ UHGXFHV WKRVH EHQHILWV ZKLOH JHQHUDWLQJ ELOOLRQV RI
dollars in illicit revenues each year, contributing to the illegal economy, fueling instability, and 
XQGHUPLQLQJ VHFXULW\« LW LV LQ WKH QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVW RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV WR combat wildlife 
WUDIILFNLQJ¶18 
This reveals how a particular approach has been reinforced from several angles. These 
framings are powerful and have a far reaching effect as they deepen and extend the dynamics of the 
War on Terror precisely because they intersect so well with the pre-existing agendas of major powers 
in the global system. Further, it demonstrates how poachers are defined in ways that provide the 
foundation for calls for a more forceful approach to conservation that can deliver a win-win of 
primarily contributing to global security, and saving species as a secondary positive outcome.  
7KHVHWKHPHVDUHUHIOHFWHGLQSXEOLFVWDWHPHQWVPDGHE\RQHRIWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWDQGPRVW
prominent conservation NGOs, Conservation International; for example, it recently stated that the 
organization sees a link between the illegal ivory trade and global terrorism: 
 
µ0RQH\IURPZLOGOLIHSRDFKLQJDQGWUDIILFNLQJLVGLUHFWO\OLQNHGWRWKHIXQGLQJRIGDQJHURXV
rebel organizations and terrorist networks. These include the Janjaweed militia in Darfur, the 
/RUG¶V5HVLVWDQFH$UP\LQ8JDQGDDQG$O6KDEDDELQ6RPDOLD² which is now linked to al 
4DHGD¶19 
 
Conservation International promotes the idea that engaging in conservation activity can contribute to 
US national interests, especially related to economy and security because competition over scarce 
                                                 
16
 0RQLFD0HGLQDµ:KLWH*ROGRI-LKDG¶1HZ<RUN7LPHVhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/opinion/the-
white-gold-of-jihad.html?_r=0 (accessed 13.08.14). 
17
  See http://www.lastdaysofivory.com/ (accessed 23.03.15). 
18
 White House (Obama Administration), ³&RPEDWLQJ:LOGOLIH7UDIILFNLQJ´ Executive Order 13648 of July 1, 2013, 
Federal Register 78(129), July 5, 2013, pp. 40621-40623. Also see Wyler and Sheikh (2013: 2)  
19
 µ*OREDO6WDELOLW\¶http://www.conservation.org/what/pages/global-stability.aspx (accessed 14.08.14). 
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resources leads to conflict, instability and failed states.20 This reflects, and repeats the conceptual 
framing of key aspects of the environmental security approach ± that there is a link between resource 
scarcity, conflict and instability.  We can go one step further and argue that it also contributes to the 
discursive production of poachers-as-terrorists, rendering them legitimate targets of a war by 
conservation, since they pose a clear and present threat to global stability and forceful action against 
them is deemed as justifiable. Conservation International has produced a short film, HQWLWOHGµ'LUHFW
&RQQHFWLRQ¶ using Harrison Ford (actor), Wes Busch of Northrop Grumman (Director of a global 
security company) and Rob Walden, Chairman of Walmart Stores (global corporation best known for 
its department stores), to underline the link between conservation and US national security and 
economic security. This is an interesting integration of security concerns with a more established 
neoliberal approach to conservation: the increasing use of celebrities and link up with corporate 
sponsors is now overlain with a new narrative of urgency around the links between biodiversity 
losses and global security (see Brockington, 2009; Büscher et al 2012; Massé and Lunstrum, 2015). 
Peter Seligmann, CEO and Chairman of Conservation International, recently linked poverty, 
trafficking and threats to global stability as well. Commenting on the new Clinton Global Initiative 
support to end wildlife trafficking he stated: 
 
µ:KDW ZH¶UH VHHLQJ KHUH LV WKH SHUIHFW VWRUP RI H[WLQFWLRQ SRYHUW\ DQG UDGLFDOLVP :H¶UH
seeing the deterioration of societies and a massive threat to the stability of not only African 
nations but the entire world. A crucial step in changing this equation is to ensure that the ivory 
WUDGHFRPHVWRDQHQG¶21 
 
However, the supporting evidence cited by Conservation International is rather narrow; it could 
be argued that the evidence base for links between poaching and terrorism is held by 
organizations such as Interpol or the CIA, and is therefore confidential, but this is not stated. The 
evidence that Peter Seligmann cited was a blog from Slate.com, which in turn referenced the EAL 
report that links ivory poaching and Al Shabaab.22   
Another leading NGO, Wildlife Conservation Society, KDV ODXQFKHG LWV µ (OHSKDQWV¶
FDPSDLJQZKLFKKDVWKUHHFHQWUDOSLOODUVµ+XPDQVDQG(OHSKDQWV¶µ7HUURUDQG,YRU\¶DQGµ+HURHV
DQG +RSH¶ ZKLFK OLQNV SRYHUW\ UHJLRQDO LQVWDELOLW\ SRDFKLQJ WHUURULVP DQG WKH UROH RI
                                                 
20
 µ3URPRWLQJ(FRQRPLF1DWLRQDODQG*OREDO6HFXULW\¶http://www.conservation.org/projects/Pages/Promoting-
Economic-National-and-Global-Security-Direct-connection.aspx (accessed 14.08.14). 
21
 3HWHU6HOLJPDQQµ2QH:D\WR)LJKW7HUURULVP(QGWKH,YRU\7UDGH¶http://blog.conservation.org/2013/10/one-way-
to-fight-terrorism-end-the-ivory-trade/ (accessed 25.03.14). 
22
 Joshua Keating, (2014) Ivory Funds Terrorism? 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2013/10/02/is_the_illegal_ivory_trade_funding_terrorist_groups_like_al_shabab
.html (accessed 13.08.14). 
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conservationists and rangers as heroes.23 Under the topic of Terror and Ivory the campaign makes 
a series of statements but does not provide any references to support the claims. It does quote the 
public statements by Hillary Clinton and by Congressman Ed Royce (co-chair of the International 
Conservation Caucus of the US Congress). The 96 Elephants campaign refers to ivory as the 
µZKLWHJROGRI-LKDG¶24 which is a reference to the terminology of the same EAL report cited by 
Conservation International.   
Hillary Clinton and The Clinton Global Initiative have also provided support for increased 
responses to poaching and trafficking. For example, in 2013 it announced a commitment to raise 
US$80 million to combat trafficking and poaching as a security threat in Africa.25 The funds will be 
used to tackle poaching and trafficking via three initiatives XQGHUWKHKHDGOLQHVRIµ6WRSWKH.LOOLQJ
6WRSWKH7UDIILFNLQJDQG6WRSWKH'HPDQG¶ during 2013-2016. The partners, or in their own terms, 
µ&RPPLWPHQW 0DNHUV¶ LQFOXGH Wildlife Conservation Society, African Wildlife Foundation, 
Conservation International, International Fund for Animal Welfare, and World Wildlife Fund.26 
The presentation of poachers-as-terrorists is epitomised by the recent United for Wildlife 
(UFW)27 #whosesideareyouon campaign. It encourages supporters to choose sides between wildlife 
and the criminals who kill them for money DQGUHIHUVWRµ%ORRG,YRU\¶DVDVRXUFHRIIXQGLQJIRUWKH
Lord¶s Resistance Army. 28 This is a clear attempt to draw connections with the idea of blood 
diamonds and the assumption that natural resources can be used to fuel conflict and instability (even 
terrorism). Such a dichotomous presentation eases the discursive (and material) production of 
poachers as legitimate targets of a war by conservation ± making their deaths not only permissible 
but necessary to save threatened wildlife. 
 International organizations have also contributed to the discursive production of poachers-
as-terrorists and therefore added weight to the idea that poaching and global insecurity are 
interlinked. John Scanlon, the Secretary-General of CITES has made the link in public statements; 
in an interview with the Guardian newspaper in 2013 he stated that µThe UN Security Council 
rHFHQWO\OLQNHGWKH/RUG¶s Resistance Army to ivory smuggling in the Democratic Republic of the 
                                                 
23
 Wildlife Conservation Society 96 Elephants campaign, available at http://96elephants.org/ (accessed 25.03.14). Also 
see http://www.wcs.org/press/press-releases/96-elephants.aspx (accessed 14.08.14). 
24
  Wildlife Conservation Society 96 Elephants Campaign, http://www.96elephants.org/chapter-2 (accessed 13.08.14). 
25
 http://www.awf.org/news/conservation-partners-announce-80m-clinton-global-initiative-commitment-action-
partnership-save 
26
  µClinton Global IniWLDWLYH&RPPLWPHQWWR$FWLRQ3DUWQHUVKLSWR6DYH$IULFD¶V(OHSKDQWV¶ http://www.wcs.org/press/press-
releases/african-elephants-get-major-boost.aspx (accessed 30.04.14).  
27
 UFW is an initiative by the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge and Prince Harry via the Royal Foundation. It brings 
together leading conservation organizations (ZSL, WCS, CI, FFI, WWF, IUCN and TNC) to cooperate to facilitate 
responses to the apparent rise in poaching and trafficking. 
28
 µ&RQIOLFW¶http://www.unitedforwildlife.org/#!/the-facts/conflict (accessed, 14.08.14). 
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Congo, while al-4DLGD¶s al-Shabaab group has been linked to illegal ivory in Somalia.¶29 Scanlon 
also addressed the US Congressional hearing on ivory and insecurity; he reported that poached 
ivory from Chad and Sudan was believed to be exchanged against money, weapons and 
DPPXQLWLRQWRVXSSRUWFRQIOLFWV LQQHLJKERXULQJFRXQWULHV¶30 Such high profile statements have 
been endorsed in more thorough reports by international organizations. A key example is the 
report by UNEP, CITES, IUCN and TRAFFIC entitled Elephants in the Dust which states: 
 
µ3ROLWLFDO LQVWDELOLW\ DUPHG PLOLWLDV FULPLQDOV DQG PRVW LPSRUWDQWO\ WKH ULVH LQ PDUNHW
demand, have once again resulted in a rise in poaching«Poaching operations range from the 
old-fashioned camel- and horse-based marauders to active intelligence units and helicopters, 
WKHXVHRIZKLFKVXJJHVWVVXEVWDQWLDOGHPDQG¶81(3HWDO 
 
The report draws on a much fuller range of unpublished, confidential and published information ± 
including data from MIKE, ETIS and CITES, as well as  a number of academic studies on poaching 
rates. However, no source is provided for the statement quoted above, but the statement in the UNEP 
report is likely to be quoted as supporting evidence by other organizations and individuals.  
The recent linkage of wildlife losses, poaching and global insecurity is revealing. What is 
significant is not necessarily whether we can establish that poaching is funding instability and even 
global terrorism, in line with the approach of environmental security (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Berdal 
and Malone (eds) 2000); the important issue is that a wide range of organizations are all 
communicating the same message in a very similar way, and that their arguments are based on a very 
narrow evidence base. In making the link to global security, the underlying reasons for the 
emergence and activities of militia and rebel JURXSVDUHOHIWDVDµEODFNER[¶DQGDUHQRWGLVFXVVHG. 
Further, it deliberately taps in to contemporary anxieties about global security threats, the 
identification of legitimate targets for military action, and the War on Terror. As Cooley and Ron 
(2002) point out, during the 1990s NGOs in the humanitarian relief sector were increasingly engaged 
in a competitive market to secure funding and contracts with donors. This dynamic was mirrored in 
the conservation sector as well, which partly explains why conservation NGOs have been so keen to 
promote the idea that poaching and trafficking constitute significant national and international 
security threats. The assumption is that by rendering poaching a security issue it will allow them to 
                                                 
29
 &DUULQJWRQ'DQLHOµ3HRSOHDQG$QLPDOVDW,PPHGLDWH5LVNIURP:LOGOLIH&ULPH&,7(6FKLHIZDUQV¶The 
Guardian (UK) http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/mar/01/people-animals-wildlife-crime (accessed 
15.08.14). 
30
 -RKQ6FDQORQH[SHUWZLWQHVVWHVWLPRQLDOWRWKH866HQDWH)RUHLJQ5HODWLRQV&RPPLWWHH+HDULQJµ,YRU\DQG,QVHFXULW\
7KH*OREDO,PSOLFDWLRQVRI3RDFKLQJLQ$IULFD¶
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Scanlon_Testimony.pdf (accessed 15.08.14). 
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tap in to the greater resources available for security and anti-terrorism initiatives (as compared with 
environmental/biodiversity conservation).  
  
4. The Material War by Conservation  
The discursive production of poachers-as-terrorists and ivory as the white gold of Jihad is not just 
semantics. There is a combined effect of so many organizations promoting the same message, based 
on a narrow evidence base of inter-linked expert testimonial, the EAL investigation and a small 
number of high profile journalist accounts.  It has a material effect on the calls for renewed forceful 
approaches to tackle poaching, underpinned by a shift in funding that is being made available to 
support new initiatives around use of COIN techniques, more commonly associated with War on 
Terror, notably use of military force, greater surveillance, development of intelligence networks and 
use of new technologies. This allows conservation to move from fortress conservation to war by 
conservation because it is increasingly integrated with the agenda of the War on Terror.  Below I set 
out examples to provide a differentiated analysis of the shifts in techniques and technologies that 
combine to produce organization within national parks, offensive positions which extend beyond 
protected areas, and approaches that are spatially extensive and rely on the production and 
cultivation of wide-ranging surveillance and intelligence gathering networks.  
First, it is clear that there has been a policy shift within some national parks which has 
promoted increasing militarization of conservation, which is spatially confined within the protected 
areas boundaries (Duffy, 2014; Smith and Humpheys, 2014). However, these shifts are interesting 
EHFDXVHWKH\DUHPDGHSRVVLEOHE\WKHµQHROLEHUDO¶SKDVHRUDSSURDFKWRFRQVHUYDWLRQVHHBüscher et 
al, 2012; and Massé and Lunstrum, 2015), since they rely on and normalise the use of the private 
sector to provide security within protected areas. A good example is the ways WWF has turned to 
private military companies (PMCs) to deliver security operations in protected areas that they manage 
on behalf of states. WWF has contracted a private military company to deliver anti-poaching. Israeli-
based Maisha Consulting offers training for poaching units in Garamba National Park, DRC and has 
provided security advice and installed a network of remote surveillance cameras in Dzangha-Sangha 
National Park in the Central African Republic.31 The use of PMCs to deliver anti-poaching was used 
on a small scale before the current rises in poaching, but it is an increasingly common approach 
especially in areas where the State lacks enforcement capacity. The discursive production of 
poachers as criminals, militias and terrorists has made it possible to consider, accept and implement 
new approaches that more closely reflect the methods of the War on Terror and global intervention. 
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 http://maisha-consulting.com/environmental-security (accessed 15.08.14). 
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This also indicates that while this paper focuses on the Horn of Africa and the War on Terror, some 
of the ways that security and conservation are being integrated are mirrored elsewhere.  
Militarization within national parks is also discernible in South AIULFD¶VFXUUHQWUKLQRZDUV 
The appointment of Major General Johan Jooste (retired) as coordinator of anti-poaching for Kruger 
National Park in South Africa in 2012 is indicative of the increasing militarization of anti-poaching 
efforts.  Jooste has argued that SANparks staff face a rising level of armed incursions by poachers, 
and that organized crime networks are involved, such that there is a need for a more aggressive 
response from those mandated with protecting rhinos. Jooste clearly identifies poaching as a 
declaration of war, linking it to wider regional security issues, such as control of illegal migration 
routes through protected areas as well as governance failures in neighbouring states, especially 
Mozambique (see Humphreys, and Smith, 2014; Rademeyer, 2013; Lunstrum, 2014; Dunn, 2009).32 
The case of South Africa also indicates how policies that are initially designed for protected areas are 
quickly and easily reconfigured for further extension outside those boundaries; for example, Massé 
and Lunstrum (2015) demonstrates how land adjacent to Kruger and on the Mozambican side of the 
border is being captured by private interests under the guise of providing security for wildlife in 
Kruger National Park). +XPSKUH\V DQG 6PLWK  SRLQW WR D µUKLQRILFDWLRQ¶ 6RXWK $IULFDQ
security, suggesting that the intensification of the anti-poaching strategy of SANParks is part of a 
trend towards militarization which resembles developments in late-modern warfare. These emphasise 
close targeting of individuals or groXSV XQGHU WKH EDQQHU RI µPDQ-KXQWLQJ¶ RU µWDUJHWHG NLOOLQJV¶
6RXWK $IULFD¶V PDQDJHPHQW SODQ IRU EODFN UKLQR SRLQWV WR WKH FULWLFDO LPSRUWDQFH RI EHWWHU
intelligence systems to prevent poaching, rather than relying on prosecutions after a rhino has been 
killed (Knight et al., 2013: 38; Department of Environmental Affairs, 2013: 20). South Africa now 
offers a cash reward of R100,000 for information which leads to arrest and R1,000,000 for successful 
conviction of the heads of criminal poaching gangs. The initiative links in with Crime Line and 
allows the public to give anonymous information via SMS.33 Büscher and Ramutsindela 
(forthcoming, 2015) argue that such approaches rely on rebuilding the kinds of intelligence and 
surveillance networks that characterized the Apartheid regime in South Africa.  
South Africa has received perhaps the greatest level of attention and particular projects have 
received large donations from philanthropists who are keen to support more forceful approaches to 
conservation (for a broader discussion of philanthropy in conservation see Ramutsindela, 
Spierenburg and Wels, 2011; and Holmes, 2012). One example is the US$25 million donation by the 
Howard G. Buffett Foundation to the Kruger National Park to set up an Intensive Protection Zone for 
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 http://www.sanparks.org/about/news/default.php?id=55388 (accessed 03.09.13) 
33
 http://www.sanparks.org/about/news/default.php?id=55388  (accessed 30.09.14) 
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rhinos inside the park during 2014-2017; another is the R26.8 million (US$ 2.5 million) donation to 
Peace Parks Foundation from the Dutch and Swedish Postcode Lotteries to work with Ezemvelo 
KZN to conserve rhinos in protected areas. Rhinos have been presented as national heritage that 
requires militarized defence against organized crime networks that originate outside the country. In 
line with arguments made by Peluso and Vandergeest (2011) it can be argued that militarized 
approaches to anti-poaching in South Africa have been used by the State to gain greater control over 
territory in the border area with Mozambique.   Concerns about security and securing the border have 
been key arguments in justifications for more forceful responses by state agencies, notably by 
SANParks (Massé and Lunstrum, 2015; Büscher and Ramutsindela, forthcoming 2015).  
National governments have also developed new initiatives to respond to the increases in 
poaching that go beyond the confines of protected areas. In February 2014 the US Government 
announced its National Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking; its three approaches are increased 
enforcement, demand reduction and increased international cooperation and commitment (White 
House, 2014). In June 2014 the UK Department of Environment, Food, Rural Affairs and the 
Department for International Development invited applications to a £10 million illegal wildlife trade 
challenge fund which was available to help develop the Elephant Protection Initiative support 
practical actions to combat poaching and trafficking in line with the three pillars of the London 
Declaration and hosting a follow up conference in Botswana in 2015.34 It was not a requirement that 
projects be linked to protected areas per se, they can extend out in spatial terms, but they could also 
be engaged at the national and regional levels, since training of law enforcement officials and 
support for design and enforcement of new national level anti-poaching laws were also supported by 
the fund.   
Finally, war by conservation is characterized by techniques that are more commonly 
associated with COIN and global security initiatives. Some indicative examples are useful here, 
many more could be cited. Google provided US$5 million to WWF to purchase and operate drones 
as part of its anti-poaching initiatives;35 and US$750,000 was provided to ZSL for installation of 
camera traps with automated sensors in Kenya; the sensors transmit alerts of gunfire, vehicle 
movement, and human presence. These two projects were funded as part of *RRJOH¶V*OREDO,PSDFW
Awards, which aim to assist in expansion of new technologies in key global challenges. The use of 
drones is not necessarily indicative of a shift to war by conservation, it is the context in which they 
are deployed which is important; for example, drones have multiple purposes and have been 
                                                 
34DEFRA/DfID Call for funding applications,  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-illegal-wildlife-trade-
challenge-fund  (accessed 15.08.14). 
35
 http://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/google-helps-wwf-stop-wildlife-crime (accessed 15.08.14) 
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promoted by drone manufacturers, scientists and some conservation organisations as a low cost 
option for data collection, including wildlife movements in remote areas that cannot be covered by 
existing parks staff (Marris, 2013). War by conservation is also discernible in material ways in 
broader anti-poaching strategies in Kenya. For example, Kenya Wildlife Service declared 2011 the 
µ\HDURIWKHUKLQR¶WRGLUHFWIRFXVDQGUHVRXUFHVWKHUKLQRUDQJHUIRUFHKDVEHHQH[SDQGHGE\PRUH
than 25% during 2011 via a process during which rhino scouts on private lands were converted into 
Kenya Police Reservists; community scouts have also been offered formal training in wildlife 
protection, sniffer dogs have been used at international ports, tracker dogs have been used for 
monitoring, and rhinos have been relocated from areas of high risk to areas of low risk (KWS, 2012: 
24).  
Another clear example of the shift to war by conservation in material ways was the launch of 
µStabilization 7KURXJK &RQVHUYDWLRQ¶ RU 6WDELO&RQ by the Tsavo Trust in December 2014. Tsavo 
Trust argues that it is a recognition that the temptation to poach can only be tackled via poverty 
reduction; it is firmly rooted within a security approach to tackling environmental change, especially 
illegal hunting of elephants. It aims to recruit and train anti-poaching units drawn from the local 
community to enhance the physical security of wildlife and communities in at-risk areas; its 
proponents also state that intelligence gathering and development of information networks are 
critical to the success of the initiative.36  It has full support from the Governor of the Tana River 
County and from the Kenyan Government. Ian Saunders, Chief Operations Officer for Tsavo Trust, 
has been appointed as the security adviser to the Governor of Tana River County; Saunders brings a 
specific set of skills and expertise since he has a background in counter insurgency operations in 
Afghanistan.37   
The production of poachers-as-terrorists, and as legitimate targets for a war by conservation, 
has had significant material effects. Conservation, global security and COIN are becoming 
increasingly integrated, which signals a significant shift from earlier phases characterized as fortress 
conservation or war for biodiversity. This has resulted in the militarization of approaches within the 
boundaries of protected areas (see Duffy, 2014; Smith and Humphreys, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014; 
Dunn, 2009); but we can also detect a range of new offensives that extend well beyond these 
boundaries and into the lands and communities that surround them; these include the extension of 
state control over territories and unruly populations (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2011). It is significant 
                                                 
36
 Stabilization Through Conservation, http://tsavotrust.org/stabilcon/  (accessed 23.03.15).  
37
 The links between conservation and stabilization were discussed at the StabilCon launch event at the Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI) in London on 1 December 2014; it was attended by Ian Saunders, Chief Operations Officer, 
Tsavo Trust, Professor Judi Wakhungu, Secretary of State for the Environment, Water and Natural Resources, Republic 
of Kenya;  Ambassador Hussein Dado, Governor, Tana River County, Republic of Kenya.  The author was an invited 
member of the discussion panel.  
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that local communities DUHDOVREHLQJGUDZQLQDQGUHFRQILJXUHGDVDµILUVWOLQHRIGHIHQFH¶DJDLQVW
poachers-as-terrorists, rendering them military operatives engaged in advancing the agendas of 
external actors concerned about global security. Further, war by conservation infuses national and 
global level policies and debates, not just in the biodiversity conservation sector but also in debates 
about how best to respond to global security concerns. This is a significant shift from fortress 
conservation and war for biodiversity into a phase of warfare that is prosecuted by conservationists. 
Furthermore, these changes demand a fresh examination of debates on the links between 
environment and conflict provided by environmental security and political ecology. Neither can fully 
explain the recent shift to war by conservation, and instead it is useful think through how 
conservation is being more fully integrated with global security concerns, which facilitates the use of 
a wider range of COIN techniques including surveillance, use of drones and camera traps, 
intelligence gathering and greater use of pre-emptive and deadly force by national armies, private 
military companies and state-based conservation agencies.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We are entering a new phase marked by a shift to war by conservation because conservation is 
becoming deeply implicated in advancing a global security agenda, such that conservation agencies 
themselves are engaged in prosecuting warfare against targets defined as poacher-terrorists. This 
shift has been facilitated by a rise in illegal hunting, especially of elephants and rhinos in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the development and deployment of new forms of surveillance technology and the 
production of a discursive link between poaching and terrorism. The remarkable similarity of 
statements from NGOs, Governments and international organizations has provided the legitimating 
arguments for the claims, especially that ivory is used to fund Al Shabaab. Using debates on 
environmental security, political ecology and interventionism, allows for a better understanding of 
how the argument of poacher-as-terrorist is being deployed and what implications it holds for 
practice on the ground.  The core themes that are more usually associated with narratives around 
global security have been effectively used and operationalizHGLQUHODWLRQWRµGHIHQFHSURWHFWLRQ¶RI
the non-human world. It has become more possible to consider and authorize the use of force in 
defence of wildlife. While conservation has a long history of using violent methods (Neumann, 
2004) including shoot-to-kill, the current phase differs because conservation is becoming a core part 
of a global security apparatus; therefore using force to protect elephants and rhinos is increasingly 
presented and justified as a win-win of conservation and global security. The implications of this in 
terms of long term conservation practice are potentially significant.  
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First the ways that conservation is integrating with security concerns has the potential to 
place rangers in the front line, not in a poaching war but in the War on Terror. This has implications 
for current and future staff. For example, rangers did not necessarily enter the profession with the 
goal of being active combatants in a War on Terror. For some this will not be acceptable, and 
conservation agencies are likely to lose valuable well trained staff at a time when they can least 
afford to.  
Second, it raises complex questions about the impact on communities of shifting to 
conservation as a form of combat or military style intervention that extends beyond the boundaries of 
protected areas. Such as shift has the capacity to fundamentally change hard won relationships with 
local communities, alienating them and reducing their support for conservation in the longer term. Of 
course there will inevitably be cases where local communities welcome greater levels of enforcement 
of parks because it provides them with security from armed groups such as LRA, Janjaweed and Al 
Shabaab.  
Third, although the extension of war by conservation both in terms of territory and strategy is 
currently confined to a few countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (notably Kenya, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Mali, Gabon and Central African Republic), it sets a precedent. It is entirely 
possible that once key populations of rhinos and elephants are either lost to poaching or are secured 
in those locations, then organized poaching will turn to new sources of supply (e.g. Namibia for 
rhinos and Botswana for elephants). Equally, if new µIURQWOLQHV¶RSHQXp in the War on Terror, then 
the war by conservation is already operational and can be more easily and quickly utilized and 
extended. There are already examples from other regions, such as the use of drones and other 
military tactics in Kaziranga National Park in India and use of drones to monitor illegal fishing in the 
territorial waters of Belize, also known as an important drug trafficking route in Central America.  
Fourth, such shifts have the capacity to undermine conservation NGOs. There are significant 
reputational risks associated with working closely with state-level security services. This is 
especially important communities that regard the state as an oppressive force rather than as a 
democratic representative and provider of security and welfare. Conservation NGOs run the risk of 
simply being regarded as facilitating and implementing the agenda of a hostile actor (the state). 
Similar arguments can be made with regard to whether conservation NGOs might be regarded as 
unwelcome agents of powerful states engaged in the War on Terror. Forming such alliances makes 
conservation a central part of a global political project ± moving it far from its core mission of trying 
to save species from extinction. 
Finally, in theoretical terms, the shift towards war by conservation presents us with a rich and 
fascinating field of conceptual enquiry. The aim of this paper is to open up that debate and indicate 
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areas for future work. It is important to investigate whether the (continuing) neoliberal phase of 
conservation laid the groundwork to make war by conservation possible; for example, without the 
neoliberal phase, would conservationists have accepted the use of private military companies so 
readily if they had not already developed such strong links with the private sector. There is capacity 
for much greater theoretical development around the limits of current environmental security and 
political ecology approaches to understanding the links between resources and conflict. 
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Appendix 1: Timeline 
 
 
2007-8 Range of conservation NGOs and government agencies start to note rises in 
elephant and rhino poaching 
2010 ICCWC established 
2012 Elephant Action League (EAL) place report on poaching their website 
Johan Jooste appointed as coordinator of anti poaching in Kruger National 
Park, identifies poaching as a declaration of war 
National Geographic and WWF convene a panel with the US Secretary of 
State on military support for anti poaching 
ICCF convenes hearing on The Global Poaching Crisis, with expert 
testimonials 
Google provides US$5 million to WWF and ZSL to develop the use of 
drones for conservation surveillance in northern Kenya  
2013 Westgate Mall attack, Nairobi 
Prince Charles convenes high level meeting to galvanise a UK response to 
poaching wars 
President Obama issues Executive Order 13648 on Combatting Wildlife 
Trafficking 
WCS launches 96 Elephants campaign 
United for Wildlife formed  
Clinton Global Initiative announce intention to raise US$80 million to 
combat poaching and trafficking  
CITES Director John E Scanlon issues a series of statements about poaching 
and global security 
UNEP report Elephants in the Dust 
 
2014 South Africa releases figures showing a threshold of 1000 rhino killed in 
one year 
Symposium on wildlife trafficking held at Zoological Society of London on 
behalf of UfW 
London Conference on the illegal wildlife trade  
London Declaration on the illegal wildlife trade arising from the London 
Conference 
UK Government DEFRA/DfID Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge fund of 
£10 million launched to support the objectives of the London Declaration  
UfW launches #whosesideareyouon 
US Government announces National Strategy to Combat Wildlife 
Trafficking 
USAID makes US$40 million available for projects tackling the illegal 
wildlife trade 
US$ 25 million donation by Howard G. Buffett Foundation for anti 
poaching in Kruger National Park 
2015 Second International Conference on the Illegal Wildlife Trade held in 
Kasane, Botswana March 2015 ± Kasane Statement issued.  
Government DEFRA/DfID commits a further £5 million for the  Illegal 
Wildlife Trade Challenge Fund  
RUSI report launched questioning the link between ivory and Al-Shabaab 
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